If I had had more time, I could have written you a shorter letter. (Blaise Pascal) 
Introduction

The Proliferation of Information Services and the Unbundling of Database Technology
We are witnessing the proliferation of the global information society with a sheer explosion of information services on a world-spanning network. This opens up unprecedented opportunities for information discovery, virtual enterprises and cyberspace-based collaboration, and also more mundane things such as electronic commerce 17, 49] . Using such services is, however, often a frustrating experience. Many information services (including Web search engines) deliver poor results -inconsistent, arbitrarily inaccurate, or completely irrelevant datato their clients, break easily and exhibit long outages, or perform so poorly that unacceptable response times ultimately render the o ered service useless. The bottom line is that the quality of services is highly unpredictable, and service quality guarantees are usually absent in today's fast-moving IT world.
Contrast this situation with the evolution of database systems. Over the last three decades, database systems have developed an outstanding reputation for keeping mission-critical data consistent, virtually never losing data, providing high availability, excellent performance for a wide variety of workload patterns, and so on. The bottom line is that database systems have proven that they are among the most dependable, intensively stress-tested services within computer science and the IT business 74]. On the ip side of the coin, however, we have to admit that full-edged database systems are typically heavy-weight platforms with a large \footprint", and many of their salient qualities can be achieved only in conjunction with a human support sta that takes care of system administration and performance tuning.
Database technology is widely viewed as the most promising candidate for a backbone of quality-conscious information services. But the database R&D community should not rest on achievements of the past. The rapidly evolving, highly diverse world of global information services calls for a new blend of database technology. Often only certain components of a database system are needed as building blocks that have to be integrated with other technologies such as work ow, multimedia, or security technologies; a prominent example for an application class with this characteristic is electronic commerce 21]. These building blocks should therefore be light-weight, easy-to-use, composable and adaptable, require \zero administration" and be self-tuning. These aspects already constitute strategic research avenues that are database-oriented but also interact with other computer science and application elds 75] . An additional dimension that I wish to highlight and focus on in this paper is the need for guaranteed service quality of both building blocks and more comprehensive information services.
The Challenge of Providing Service Quality Guarantees
The objective of providing services with guaranteed quality poses a variety of research challenges. First and above all, we need a better understanding of what kinds of guarantees are useful and how to express them in a rigorous yet comprehensible manner. The overriding goal is to develop highly dependable systems. This includes provably correct behavior, high reliability and availability in the presence of component failures, and predictably good performance even under stress conditions. Thus service quality must comprise both qualitative and quantitative properties; examples can already be found in speci c areas:
On the qualitative side, guaranteed termination of work ows or other active application components is an example 2, 20] . In addition to the mere termination, one should ideally guarantee an outcome that is acceptable to the user in terms of her business or private goals (e.g., granting loans only to credit-worthy customers, or purchasing a gameboy within certain nancial constraints). Thus, this kind of service quality requires formal reasoning on the speci cation of the work ow, but also failure-resilience and availability guarantees from an underlying recovery manager.
On the quantitative side, consider the notion of \quality of service (QoS)" in the area of multimedia storage and communication 14, 84] . This involves quantifying the presentation quality of video and audio streams in terms of guaranteed bandwidth or guaranteed playback \smoothness". In addition, throughput and startup-latency metrics are of major interest, too, as storage servers and network switches serve many clients concurrently. Finally, the cost of such servers is a non-negligible issue, which demands good resource utilization. Then, the quality of service could be of stochastic nature for a better cost/performance ratio. For example, smooth playback could be guaranteed only with a speci able probability close to one.
However, many properties of information services for which we would like to establish service quality guarantees have both qualitative and quantitative facets. Sometimes, properties are perceived by the user as qualitative (or merely ordinal), but should ideally be quanti ed for comparison purposes. The quality of information retrieval services such as Web search engines falls into this grey area, and intelligent similarity searching of multimedia documents or scienti c data exhibits similar problems 4, 24, 34, 65] . Furthermore, one may encounter inherent tradeo s between di erent notions of service quality. In a data warehouse environment 11, 85] , for example, one may consider trading the completeness, accuracy, or timeliness of query results for faster response and thus quicker, although less profound decision support. It seems that a thorough understanding of the notion of service quality and its rami cations and implications is sorely lacking, yet I would claim that such insight and rigorous reasoning about service quality is crucial for building and deploying truly dependable information systems.
Objective and Outline of the Paper
This paper aims to increase the consciousness about service quality guarantees and the need for truly dependable information systems, and to encourage more intensive work on this subject. To this end, I will attempt to sort out the issues of the subject and sketch a \big picture" for various research directions. I will primarily use an example scenario from the area of work ow management, but many of the issues that I will bring up are likely to be relevant for other kinds of information services, too.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces several categories of service quality in a more systematic manner, to clarify terminology and identify the important issues. Section 3 presents a detailed discussion of an example scenario from the area of work ow management, serving as a demonstrator for both promising approaches and further research needs on various facets of service quality. Finally, Section 4 is a preliminary and subjective attempt to outline some strategic research avenues towards quality guarantees and highly dependable information systems.
Notions of Service Quality and Dependability
When setting o on a discussion of di erent notions of service quality, the rst thing one is faced with is a confusing plethora of existing terminology, especially many \ities" such as reliability, availability, predictability, authenticity, and so on. The purpose of this section is to organize all these notions into a systematic framework and clarify their meanings. In Subsection 2.1, I will rst consider desirable properties of an entire information system. In Subsection 2.2, I will then shift the focus to individual processes that are controlled by a system and the service qualities that are relevant for a single process. Finally, in Subsection 2.3, I will address the quality notions that one may associate with information units and the ltering of information. As we will see, all three categories include both quantitative and qualitative properties. As a general disclaimer, let me add that the entire discussion is highly informal and merely serves to sketch a crude roadmap of what we should be aiming at.
System-centric Notions
The overriding, most comprehensive notion of quality for all kinds of missioncritical (information) systems is known as dependability, meaning that the system is so trustworthy that its users are able and willing to fully depend on such a system. A fashionable catchphrase with more or less the same meaning is the notion of survivability, indicating that such high-quality systems should survive all kinds of external impacts such as load peaks, disasters, or hacker attacks, ideally without any user-noticeable disruption or degradation.
Dependability comprises a number of technical notions:
Reliability: This is the probability that a system does not break (within a given time horizon) in a non-repairable way, so that some damage would be noticeable to the user. In database systems, for example, a non-repairable failure would be the non-recoverable loss or inconsistency of data (e.g., because of a double or triple disk failure). Reliability is a measure for both system components such as single disks and the overall system. By appropriately designed redundancy (e.g., disk mirroring, RAIDs, database backups and log les, mirroring of entire servers), one can build highly reliable systems from less reliable components. Availability:
The redundancy in a system can be exploited to repair failures at the system level that would be non-repairable at the component level. For example, a log le serves to provide recovery after a server or disk crash. During the repair the system may not be able to provide its regular service to the users. The availability of the system then is de ned as the probability that the system will not be (temporarily) down at a randomly chosen point within a given time horizon. In practice, one is mostly interested in the expectation value (i.e., the mean) of the availability, which can be shown to be the quotient MT T F MT T F +MTTR . Here MTTF denotes the mean time to failure, i.e., the timespan between completing a repair and being hit by the next (repairable) failure, and MTTR denotes the mean time to repair, i.e., the timespan between a failure and completing the repair. Thus, availability can be increased by ensuring that failures are infrequent (MTTF is high), but also by ensuring short MTTR. This is why the e ciency of database redo recovery is such a crucial objective, and (crash and media) recovery algorithms exploit many tricks for log truncation, etc. Integrity: This requires that certain logical invariants hold for the state of an information system. In database systems, these would be user-speci ed as well as internal consistency constraints on the data. Such constraints should be interpreted as a necessary (but not su cient) condition for the state of the real-world business being properly captured by the database. Security: This aims to ensure that only explicitly authorized and properly authenticated users can invoke certain operations, access certain data, etc. The hardest part towards this objective is to ensure that the authorization and authentication mechanisms cannot be circumvented by an intruder. This is where cryptographic methods come into play for encrypting data, but also for digital signatures for authentication, watermarking to detect piracy, ensuring customer anonymity in speci c electronic-commerce settings, and so on. Performance: As its primary objective, this includes ensuring user-acceptable response time for speci c operations of the system. Respone-time goals may di er across operation types and also user classes. As most information services are multiuser systems with many clients, a second metric to consider is the throughput of the system, i.e., the number of successfully completed user-invoked operations per time unit. Response time should then be interpreted under the constraint that the system can sustain a certain throughput that corresponds to the total user-induced load (e.g., an arrival rate of operations, or a number of concurrently active users). This gives rise to the complication that response time involves queueing delays because of contention for system resources (e.g., memory, disk I/O, network bandwidth, locks on data), an e ect that is largely underrated yet can become disastrous during load peaks. Network and server queueing is exactly what makes many services on the World Wide Web so awfully slow. Performability: Upon component failures, modern information systems may be able to provide continued service even during the repair period, for example, by switching some fraction of the load to a mirror server. This way a certain class of failures can, in principle, be masked to the users. However, the continued service typically degrades in its performance. The failed resources (e.g., a disk) decrease the system's throughput and thus potentially increase the response time, and the additional resource consumption of the ongoing repair (e.g., the on-line reconstruction of a failed disk) further aggravates this problem. Quantifying these e ects leads to the notion of \performability", a combination of performance and availability 40, 70] . In essence, this metric can be viewed as the performance weighted by the availability of resources (including both degraded repair periods and total downtimes of the entire service). Veri ability: Ideally, all the above properties should be veri able in a rigorous sense. In particular, the correctness of the entire system functionality should be (mathematically) provable. This would involve proving that the implemented system conforms to a formal speci cation of what it is supposed to do in its operational real-world environment. In the database and information systems community, probably all people agree that this is an extremely elusive goal if not merely wishful thinking, given the complexity of information systems. For years to come, I do not consider veri ability at the system level as a feasible goal, but I will come back to a less ambitious, limited-scope variant of this theme in the following Subsection 2.2.
Process-centric Notions
Modern database servers encompass not only the traditional issues of data management but, to a substantial extent, also aspects of the application logic itself, by means of trigger-like rules, stored procedures, application-speci c \car-tridges", \data blades", or \extenders", and so on. Furthermore, a major trend in information systems is towards three-tier architectures with the middle tier (i.e., in the middle between clients and data servers) being an application server for so-called business objects, for example, a TP monitor, a Web application server, an object request broker, or a work ow management system 2, 30, 56] .
Each application process that executes in such an environment calls for certain service qualities or execution guarantees to be ensured by the surrounding middleware and additional support tools. In particular, veri ability of speci c properties may be reconsidered at the limited-scope level of individual processes. Such properties can be classi ed into the following categories 3, 47]:
Safety properties: A safety property demands that, at each point in the execution of a process, the process state satis es certain logical invariants. Intuitively, this aims to ensure that \some bad thing never happens" in the lifetime of a process. Such a property may be either generic in that it should hold for all types of processes, an example being the isolation property of database transactions, requiring that an ongoing process does not see any e ects of concurrent transactions nor does it expose its own e ects to those concurrent transactions, or application-speci c in that it should hold for (each instance of) a particular process type, an example being that a trip planning process must not exceed a given travel budget.
Liveness properties: A liveness property demands that a process is guaranteed to make progress towards achieving its goal, by enforcing and/or disallowing certain patterns of state transitions in a process. Intuitively, this aims to ensure that \some good thing nally happens". Like safety properties, liveness properties can also be either generic, examples being the absence of deadlocks and starvations, or the atomicity property of database transactions, requiring that a process is eventually executed to completion or leaves no traces, or application-speci c, an example being that a trip planning process must eventually include airline tickets as well as hotel reservations, or should not make any arrangements at all.
Information-centric Notions
Retrieving the relevant information for a speci c need has become one of the greatest challenges in the information-highway era. Today, two classical mainstream technologies are available to cope with this problem: database systems and information retrieval. However, with the increasing importance of semistructured information, multimedia information, push-technology information feeds, complex OLAP and data-mining applications 10, 25, 26, 42, 58] , the borderline between these two paradigms becomes blurred and ultimately obsolete. So the paradigms themselves need to be reconsidered and probably merged into a novel class of information ltering capabilities. The overriding issue will be information quality, which entails a number of dimensions:
Accuracy: This is a measure for the \resolution" of the retrieved information, capturing the spectrum between exact query answers in traditional database settings and approximative, potentially \uncertain" answers in information retrieval and other global information systems that are based on semistructured data. Sometimes, the deviation from the exact result can be quanti ed, for example when aggregation queries are executed by an intelligent sampling process; possibly, the deviation is only probabilistically bounded (i.e., through a condence interval), but this may be acceptable for many applications including data warehousing. In information retrieval, where query results are usually ranked lists, the traditional (albeit not undebated) metric for measuring the accuracy of a result is the precision. Essentially the precision of the top N elements of a query result is the probability that these elements are perceived as relevant by the user. Comprehensiveness: This measure states how \complete" a query result is with regard to the principally available information. Traditional database queries are always hundred percent comprehensive, but with global information mediators searching large numbers of data sources one may often be willing to compromise this ideal. In information retrieval and especially Web search engines, hundred percent comprehensiveness is virtually infeasible. The metric that has traditionally been used in information retrieval for measuring comprehensiveness is the recall of a query. Essentially the recall of the top N elements of a query result is the probability that no relevant information is missing, where relevance would refer to the top N information units (e.g., documents) that the user would consider most relevant if she knew the entire (usually huge) set of accessible units (e.g., the World Wide Web or all URLs known to a search engine). Timeliness: Information may be up-to-date, slightly outdated, or hopelessly aged and thus of little value (unless you are a historian). Thus, users would like to obtain, along with a query's result, an indication of the timeliness of retrieved information. Whereas this poses little problems with an individual (HTML or XML) document, the issue can become very complex with derived information that combines results from di erent data sources (which may in turn use lazy replication etc.). Credibility: As information is subject to plagiarism, faking, and all kinds of accidental or malicious distortions, users should be concerned about the genuineness or credibility of the information they retrieve from global data sources. This raises the issue of being able to trace the \construction" of some piece of information back to its origins. For example, global query engines that combine results from a number of data sources should explain, upon demand, where and how they obtained their query results and the underlying information pieces in a user-comprehensible manner. Cost-e ectivity: Retrieving information is almost always associated with some cost. This may be a monetary cost that re ects the value of the information, which would be highly subjective (i.e., depending on the user), or the cost that arises from the resource consumption in the underlying information and communication system (e.g., memory, disk I/Os, network bandwidth). With many users competing for resources, higher resource consumption often result in higher monetary cost, sometimes being charged to the user, sometimes \only" requiring more expensive servers (e.g., for data warehousing). Further note that requiring fast query responses almost inevitably entails higher resource consumption. Latency: Queries typically return a set or ranked list of results. Often users wish to see the rst portion of the result fast, while they do not care that much about the response time for obtaining the entire result set (or a long fraction of a result list). This kind of query latency should therefore be considered as an important metric by itself, which may be optimized independently of the traditional response time metric.
A Simple Case Study On Service Quality Guarantees
This section presents a more concrete example of what service quality could mean, which assets we can build on towards achieving it, and which research avenues need to be further explored. More speci cally, I will consider a workow management scenario, covering both process-centric and system-centric notions of service quality. Dependable management of enterprise-wide or even enterprise-spanning work ows is an important prerequisite for mission-critical process-centric applications. Beyond its more conventional applications such as credit-request or insurance-claim processing in banks and insurances, work ow technology also bears a great potential for applicability in more advanced forms of electronic commerce applications and \virtual-enterprise" collaborations (e.g., in negotiating and setting up maintenance and service contracts between customers, merchants, vendors, and contractors for outsourced services). Subsection 3.1 introduces an example scenario and some terminology on work ow management. Subsection 3.2 will discuss approaches for guaranteeing application-speci c safety and liveness properties of the considered workow. Then, Subsection 3.3 will complement these kinds of service qualities by approaches for providing additional generic execution guarantees, taking into account the potentially failure-prone system environment in which a work ow is embedded. Finally, Subsection 3.4 takes a more global viewpoint and addresses system-level qualities towards a highly dependable work ow infrastructure.
Example Scenario: Travel Planning Work ow
A work ow is a set of activities (or steps) that belong together in order to achieve a certain business goal. Activities can be completely automated or based on interaction with a human user and intellectual decision-making. In particular, an activity can spawn requests to an arbitrary \invoked application" that is provided by some server independently of the current work ow. To orchestrate a work ow's activities, it is crucial to specify (a template for) the control and data ow between activities (although it may still be necessary to improvise at run-time, e.g., in medical applications). Making the \ ow of work" between activities explicit in that it is factored out of the entire application, is exactly the key leverage from work ow technology in that it allows a company or other institution to largely automate the repetitive, stereotypic parts of its processes, and to quickly adjust the processes to changing business needs 20, 35, 43, 79] .
As a concrete example for a work ow, consider the activities that are necessary in the planning of a business trip, say a trip to a conference. Suppose your manager (or professor) allows you to choose one scienti c or developer's conference that you may attend. This involves the following activities: Select a conference, based on its subject, technical programme, time and place. If no suitable conference is found, then the process is terminated. Check out the registration fee for the conference, which often depends on memberships of yours, tutorials that you may wish to attend, etc.
Check out the cost of the trip to this conference, typically by delegation to a travel agency. Compare the total cost of attending the selected conference to the allowed budget, and decide to attend the conference only if the cost is within the budget. It is desirable to allow several trials with di erent conferences but the number of trials should be limited.
The activities and the control ow between them are graphically depicted in Figure 1 . This illustration is based on a speci cation formalism that is known as statecharts 37, 38] , which is one particular kind of formal speci cation method used by work ow management systems 82]. State charts have been adopted by the UML industry standard for its behaviorial elements. Each oval denotes a state in which the work ow can be during its execution. Each state in turn corresponds to one activity; so the activity is spawned when the state is entered. The activity may then invoke further application programs. When the work ow is started, a speci ed initial state, i.e., a state without predecessors, is entered, and the work ow terminates when a nal state, i.e., a state without successors, is reached. In the example, the initial state is the \SelectConference" state, and the nal states are \Go" and \No". The transitions between states are governed by event-condition-action rules that are attached to the transition arcs as labels. The meaning of a rule of the form \E C] / A" is that the transition res if event E has occurred and condition C is true in the current state. Then the current state is left and the state where the transition arc points to is entered; during this transition the speci ed action A is performed. In the example, we only make use of conditions and actions. Both refer to a small set of variables (instantiated for each work ow instance) that are relevant for the control ow. This kind of control ow speci cation allows conditional execution as well as loops based on high-level predicates. The entire speci cation can be hierarchical, thus supporting both top-down re nement as well as bottom-up composition of existing building blocks, by allowing states to be nested. So a state can in turn contain another statechart that is executed when the state is entered. In addition, the speci cation formalism allows also parallel execution, which is graphically indicated by breaking a state down into two or more so-called orthogonal components, separated by a dashed line, that are executed in parallel. In the example, the activities that correspond to the two states \CheckConfFee" and \CheckTravelCost" are executed in parallel. These two states are further re ned into several steps, where \CheckTravelCost" again leads to two parallel substates.
Work ow-speci c Safety and Liveness Guarantees
An \absolute" veri cation of a work ow, in the sense of proving that the formal work ow speci cation matches the user's intuitive intention, would be wishful thinking. What can be done, however, is to verify certain particularly critical properties of a work ow, thus strengthening the user's con dence in the overall correctness. To this end, we need three \ingredients": a formal language for specifying the work ow itself, a formal language for expressing the properties we wish to verify, and an automatic (or possibly but less preferably semi-automatic) proof technique.
Statecharts as introduced above are a formal language with mathematically well-de ned underpinnings 37, 39, 83] , and thus t our purpose. Other methods may be suitable as well, most notably, languages based on Petri Nets, temporal logic, or process algebras (see, e.g., 13, 22, 62, 63] ), along with other veri cation approaches (see, e.g., 53, 69, 72] for considerations in the work ow context). However, among these alternatives, statecharts seem to lead to particularly ecient proof techniques.
For capturing safety and liveness properties of processes, variants of temporal logic are a well established formalism 23, 52] . A particularly attractive variant is the Computation Tree Logic (CTL), as it reconciles reasonably e cient tractability with an expressiveness that seems to be su cient for our work ow context. CTL uses propositional logic formulas over a nite set of variables as its elementary building blocks. In a given state of a process, such a formula is evaluated to either true or false in the usual manner. In addition, CTL allows to apply existential and universal quanti ers, denoted E and A, respectively, to statetransition paths. So a quanti er ranges over the set of possible execution paths originating from a given state (a so-called \Kripke structure" Once critical work ow properties are formally stated, they can now be veri ed against the formal speci cation of the work ow, using appropriate proof techniques. One approach would be to use full-edged theorem provers. However, in many cases this approach is computationally infeasible. As a less powerful, but much more e cient approach, the model checking technique can be used 15]. This technique builds on the assumption that the model under investigation is a nite one, i.e., has nitely many states, and then essentially checks that a given property like a CTL formula holds for a given nite-state automaton that is derived from the actual model. In logic terminology, model checking tests if the nite-state automaton is a model of the formula (i.e., the formula holds in this structure, but is not necessarily a tautology), hence the name of the technique.
The most e cient variant of model checking is known as symbolic model checking 54] . Symbolic model checking is based on a compact, symbolic representation of a nite state automaton, viewed as a Boolean function, in terms of an ordered binary decision diagram (OBDD) 55]. Model checking is widely popular for the veri cation of hardware designs (e.g., VHDL speci cations) and lowlevel communication protocols 16] . It has recently been applied also to a simple electronic-commerce protocol to ensure properties like \money atomicity" 41].
In the following, we will sketch how model checking can be applied to verify critical properties of work ow speci cations.
3.2.1 Guaranteed Work ow Behavior. In our example scenario, possibly critical properties could be:
S: The allowed budget for the trip must not be exceeded. L: The travel planning work ow must eventually terminate either with a booked trip (state \Go") or with giving up on the intended conference trip (state \No"). Note that the rst property is a safety property and the second one a liveness property, hence the short labels S and L. To capture these properties in CTL, we encounter the di culty that condition S refers to the integer variables \Bud-get" and \Cost". Comparisons of integer variables are not allowed in CTL's underlying propositional logic. Moreover, with integer variables, the work ow speci cation itself is strictly speaking no longer a nite-state system. So the rst step towards applying model checking is to transform the work ow speci cation into a model without integer variables. To this end, we resort to the \trick" of intellectually modifying the work ow speci cation by recoding an integer comparison as a Boolean variable. So in the example, we introduce a new Boolean variable \BudgetOk" that is to be set by the \CheckCost" activity. This variable is set to true if and only if Cost Budget and to false otherwise. Similarly, we replace the integer test Trials 3 by a new Boolean variable \TrialsOk", again to be set by the \CheckCost" activity. So, in essence we shift the complexity of such counters, integer arithmetics, etc. into the activities, thus being able to abstract from the necessary computations at the level of the work ow specication. Note that this kind of transformation yields an equivalent statechart in the sense that its execution paths correspond one-to-one to those of the original statechart. Further note that, although our trick is certainly not a general recipe and may be fairly limited in its applicability, we believe that work ow speci cations (as opposed to general-purpose concurrent programs) are typically simple enough in their use of integer variables that the trick should be of wide use. Now that we have only a nite set of work ow states and a nite set of Boolean variables, we are in the position to formally capture, as CTL formulas, the above two properties that the example work ow should provably satisfy:
S: AG ( not in(Go) or BudgetOk ) to be read as: on all future states on all execution paths (originating from the current state), having reached the state \Go" implies that the Boolean variable \BudgetOk" is true (an equivalent CTL formula would be not EF ( in(Go) and not BudgetOk )) L: AF ( in(Go) or in(No) ) to be read as: on all future states on all execution paths, nally state \Go" or state \No" is entered
In the above formulas, the term \in(s)" with some state s can simply be interpreted as a Boolean variable that is true if and only if state s is entered. So this construct does not add any additional complexity to CTL.
Such formulas are admittedly not exactly what a typical business-process designer would like to deal with. It seems, however, that most interesting and critical properties of work ows follow certain patterns in the structure of their corresponding CTL formula. So there is a good chance that one can construct a simpler, more user-friendly (e.g., graphical) \macro" language on top, hiding most of the complexity of CTL (see, e.g., 6, 45] for approaches towards such macro patterns). Now we are merely one small step away from applying model checking to our work ow speci cation. This last step consists of converting the work ow specication into an explicit nite state automaton. Although the work ow intuitively appears to be \something like a nite state automaton", it still contains some elements that do not t with the conventional notion of such automata. First, the speci cation contains orthogonal states and also nested states. Second, Boolean variables and especially propositional logic formulas over such variables (e.g., CostOk and TrialsOk) require some treatment.
The rst issue is settled by forming cross-products of all states that can be entered simultaneously and adding these cross-products to the overall set of states (in addition to the \simple" states). This needs to be applied to both states that correspond to orthogonal components and states that form a nesting hierarchy. So in the example, we construct, among many others, a new ve-tuple state \(CheckConfFee, SelectTutorials, CheckTravelCost, CheckAirfare, CheckHotel)". With nested states, there are obvious optimizations, as the innermost state implicitly represents its parent states, too. In the worst case, the overall state space consists of the power set of all \simple" states, a potentially huge, but de nitely nite set. Fortunately, this kind of \state explosion" problem is not that dramatic in most application cases. Also, e cient model checking tools are well able to handle state spaces in the order of hundred thousand states. Indeed, this capability is a distinguished characteristic of model checking, as opposed to many other proof techniques.
The second issue above, Boolean variables and formulas, is resolved by explicitly constructing the context of a work ow speci cation, which we de ne as the variable-to-value mapping of the work ow's variables. The value of a Boolean formula is fully determined by the (set of) currently entered state(s) and the current context. Furthermore, the set of possible contexts is nite. Thus, the cross-product of the work ow state space and the possible contexts constitutes again a nite set that we coin the set of work ow con gurations. This set of con gurations is exactly the state set of a nite-state automaton with a transition from a source state to a target state if and only if the corresponding source con guration of the work ow can lead to the corresponding target con guration in one step of the work ow execution.
The model checking procedure operates on this kind of nite state automaton. It is essentially an iterative state-marking procedure that proceeds by structural induction on the given CTL formula. So it rst marks all states in which the most elementary subformulas hold. Then it considers the composition of subformulas according to the given formula, and derives the markings for a composite formula from those of its constituents. For example, with given markings for subformulas p and q, the marking for p and q simply is the intersection of the two markings. The marking for the temporal formula AX p (in words: p holds in all possible next states) is the set of states for which all successor states are marked with p. Finally, the markings for the more expressive quanti ed formulas such as AG p are derived from the marking of p by computing a xpoint, namely, the set of states in which p and AX p and AXX p and AXXX p and . . . holds. This xpoint computation is itself an iterative procedure that marks, in its i-th iteration, a state if this state has been marked with p and all its successor states have been marked in the (i-1)st iteration. Given that the overall state space is nite, the termination of the xpoint computation is guaranteed. Similarly simple procedures exist for all combinations of quanti ers and temporal modalities. The nal result of the model checking is obtained by reading the nal markings: a property holds for the work ow if and only if the automaton's initial state is marked with the property's corresponding CTL formula.
As mentioned above, this classical way of model checking can be substantially improved in terms of its e ciency by using symbolic model checking based on OBDDs 54, 55]. Our toy examples above can be veri ed in a few seconds, and even much more complex, realistic work ow examples can be handled in the order of minutes (see 82] for experimental experience).
Towards Guaranteed Application Behavior. The kind of work ow
veri cation sketched in the previous subsection is by far not complete. It provably guarantees correct work ow behavior only relative to the assumption that the invoked applications work correctly. Those applications themselves are, however, treated as black boxes in our approach. So we would wish to expand the correctness reasoning to capture also (some aspects of) the application behavior, for example, incorporating integrity constraints of the underlying databases that are typically manipulated by invoked applications. Some ideas along these lines can be found in 64, 76] , making use of model checking and also more powerful theorem-proving techniques.
One particularly intriguing approach could be to incorporate assertions about the behavior of an invoked application. For example, the \CheckTravelCost" activity in our travel planning scenario could be characterized by an assertion like for the \CheckConfFee" activity (assuming civilized behavior of all conference organizers) and even Boolean formulas over such arithmetic constraints. Enriching the work ow speci cation with this kind of assertions does, of course, make the veri cation problem much harder. Model checking alone would no longer be su cient, and would rather have to be combined with other techniques, for example, constraint solvers. Such a combined veri cation approach for concurrent programming is presented in 19].
Generic Execution Guarantees
So far we have implicitly assumed an idealized, namely, failure-free system environment in which a work ow execution takes place. In real systems that are susceptible to all sorts of process, computer, and network communication failures, the quality guarantees that we derived in the previous subsection do not necessarily hold anymore. So the kind of guarantees that we discussed in the previous subsection need to be complemented by generic execution guarantees. The question that arises next is what kinds of generic guarantees we need and how they can be e ciently provided by a work ow management system and/or other middleware, leveraging techniques from transaction processing (TP) systems 9, 33, 56]. The following survey-style discussion of these issues will be structured by the types of failure situations that may arise and have to be dealt with.
Failure-resilient Work ow State and Context. When a client ini-
tiates a work ow execution (e.g., an instance of our travel planning example), a work ow server with a work ow management system is responsible for the execution, particularly, for maintaining the state and context of the work ow instance as it executes (i.e., the \work ow con guration" in the sense of Subsection 3.2.1).
Now consider a failure of the work ow server after the work ow execution has entered the state \CheckCost" for the rst time. If, upon being restarted, the server had simply forgotten the state and context of the work ow, the client would have to manually re-initiate the entire work ow, possibly being forced to type again the same input and repeat dialogs, etc. With realistic, long-lived work ows that would be much more complex than our simple example scenario, a substantial amount of work over an extended time period may be lost, and nobody would ever be willing to rely on work ow technology for mission-critical processes.
The straightforward solution for the work ow server is to keep the state and context of a work ow in a persistent, reliably managed store, and record the necessary updates whenever the work ow performs a state transition or the value of a work ow variable changes. The most obvious implementation would use a database for this purpose; alternatively the work ow server could maintain its own persistent log le. However, it is not su cient to simply record each change to the state or context separately. Rather it is crucial that all variable changes that are associated with the completion of an activity and the subsequently ring state transitions are embedded within a single atomic transaction. To see that this is indeed necessary, consider a situation where the work ow has reached the state \CheckCost" and the value of the \Cost" variable is 2000 with an allowed budget of 1000. Now suppose the work ow server records the state transition itself on persistent store but does not do so with the updated value of the \Cost" variable. When the server fails at this point and is later restarted, it would resume the work ow in the \CheckCost" state but with an assumed value of 0 for the \Cost" variable (i.e., the variable's last value before the non-recorded update). As a result, the work ow would then erroneously enter the \Go" state.
So we require that all actions on behalf of the current state's outgoing transition are combined into an atomic transaction. This transaction includes: all updates to work ow variables that have been modi ed by the activity that is run in the current state (i.e., the return code and other result parameters of the activity), the state modi cation that results from the ring of the current state's outgoing transition, and all updates to work ow variables that are triggered by the transition itself (i.e., the A part of the transition's ECA rule).
With this kind of transactional state and context tracking, problems such as the one above are eliminated, and the server is guaranteed to recover from a failure to the most recent, work ow-consistent state and context. So once the initialization of a work ow execution has been successfully recorded on the server, the server guarantees the complete execution of the work ow, and more than that, an exactly-once execution. Note that this is a much stronger guarantee than the mere atomicity of a database transaction. The latter means \all or nothing" and places the burden of handling the \nothing" outcome on the client. The di culty lies in situations where the client would have to resubmit a seemingly failed work ow, while at the same time avoiding that any successful parts are executed a second time with possibly non-idempotent e ects. An exactly-once property, on the other hand, combines such an at-least-once execution, which could involve resubmissions, with an idempotence guarantee using state-testing methods (e.g., log sequence numbers in database pages).
The presented technique has rst been proposed in a number of work oworiented research projects (see especially 67]), and is probably used by all industrial-strength work ow management systems.
Distributed Work ows. The issue of the previous subsection becomes
more complicated when the work ow execution is spread across multiple, independent work ow servers. This will be the standard situation for work ows that span di erent enterprises, for example, to support so-called \virtual enterprises" in the context of business-to-business electronic commerce (e.g., outsourcing of service provisioning). In fact, even within a large enterprise one often nds largely autonomous organizational units where the decentralized responsibilities for certain activities or subwork ows typically entails a distributed work ow execution. In our example scenario, this could be the case for the two parallel activities \CheckConfFee" and \CheckTravelCost" (with the latter's subactivities possibly being again decentralized across an airline and a hotel reservation server). So the ring of the transition from state \SelectConference" to the superstate (left unnamed in Figure 1 ) that contains the two parallel subordinate statecharts should spawn two follow-up activities. In a distributed execution, however, the two corresponding servers need to be noti ed by the work ow server that was in charge of \SelectConference" activity and the ring transition. If only one of these two servers, say the one for \CheckTravelCost" is successfully noti ed, and the corresponding message to the other server is lost by a network or server failure, the overall work ow system may end up with an inconsistent situation. The sending server would have to repeat its noti cation message to the second server whereas the message to the rst server must not be resent to ensure the exactly-once semantics.
The solution to this problem again is to leverage existing TP technology 9, 33, 56] by combining the noti cations of both receiving servers in a single, distributed transaction based on a standardized two-phase commit protocol like XA or its CORBA counterpart OTS. Even better, we can combine the update of the sending server's state and context information with the two noti cations into a single, three-site transaction. The atomicity of this transaction guarantees that the state transition out of the \SelectConference" state is globally perceived as taking place exactly once.
There are, however, situations where the above solution incurs certain inconveniences in terms of the independence and ultimately performance of the involved servers. For example, if one of the receiving servers is temporarily unavailable, it may not be possible to commit the three-party transaction. Then even the activity of the available receiving server could not be started until the other server is restarted (or reconnected to the network) and commits the noti cation. As the processing times of activities may vary by orders of magnitude, this delay of one of two parallel activities could possibly become a severe problem. So a better solution is to \decouple" the involved servers by using a \middle man" in the form of failure-resilient, transactional queues. The sender would simply place the noti cation in two queues, one for each receiver, and could immediately commit the update of its own local state and context. The two receivers can now independently dequeue the noti cation. When doing this, each one of them must, however, still combine the dequeueing and its own persistent recording into a single transaction. The bene t of this method is that the dequeued message would automatically be placed back in the receiver's queue (by the undoing of the transaction) if the update to the receiver's local state and context fails. So the overall three-party protocol is broken down into three transactions. Each of these three is still a distributed transaction, between a work ow server and a queue manager, the latter typically being a TP monitor or possibly an ORB (object request broker) in modern middleware. The net result is that the work ow can progress across largely autonomous servers in a loosely coupled manner while still ensuring the exactly-once execution of the work ow.
The sketched technique has long been used in TP environments for so-called queued transactions, which can be viewed as a very limited form of work ow, typically restricted to sequential chains of transactions 9, 33] . The use of queued transactions for distributed work ow is discussed, for example, in 1, 59].
3.3.3 Incorporating Invoked Applications. At this point one should wonder how the above approaches cope with the external e ects of the applications that are invoked by the work ow's activities. For example, the \CheckTravel-Cost" activity may actually go ahead and make hotel and/or ight reservations, typically involving database servers that are not under the control of a workow server. The situation to consider here is when the work ow servers make an atomic state transition in the assumption that an activity completed successfully, whereas the activity's invoked application fails and loses its work.
The solution is to incorporate also the invoked application's external e ects in the atomic state transition whenever this is feasible. So when an activity completes, a distributed atomic transaction includes all of the following actions: the state transition on the work ow server that is responsible for the completing activity, including all modi cations of work ow variables that result from the activity and the state transition, the noti cation of the work ow servers that are responsible for newly entered states and the corresponding activities, ideally by enqueueing messages into the receiving servers' queues (see above), and, now in addition, the updates that the completing activity's invoked application has made on one or more external databases and/or other types of encapsulated \business objects" (e.g., CORBA-style persistent objects). This method is feasible only if all data servers that are a ected by the invoked application support a standardized commit protocol for transaction atomicity. With widely available support for XA or OTS, this assumption is often satis ed. Without this assumption, on the other hand, we need to address the issue by a more fundamental approach to be discussed in Subsection 3.3.5.
Atomicity
Spheres. An intriguing idea that arises from the previous subsection's considerations is to combine multiple activities and their corresponding applications into a single transaction or \sphere of atomicity" 33].
Note that this has a priori nothing to do with making work ows failure-resilient and providing reliable exactly-once execution. Rather such more general atomicity spheres serve as an additional convenience for the work ow designer to specify the intended behavior in the case of certain \semantically failing" activity outcomes such as not being able to nd a hotel with vacant rooms. In our example scenario, we could wish to combine the two (sub-) activities for the (sub-) states \CheckHotel" and \CheckFlight" into a single atomic unit. Then upon the semantic failure of \CheckHotel", the e ects of the \CheckFlight" activity and its invoked application should be automatically undone. The same e ect could equally well be achieved by explicitly specifying the desired exception handling in the work ow speci cation language (i.e., by adding appropriate states and activities to the statechart), and for semantically more sophisticated cases of exception handling this would be necessary anyway. So we face a ne borderline between generic execution guarantees in the form of atomicity spheres and application-speci c safety and liveness properties when the exception handling is explicitly modeled.
Once atomicity spheres are given by indicating the activities that belong to one atomic unit, the techniques for ensuring the atomicity are rather well known. There are two cases:
When all invoked applications of the sphere's activities support a standardized commit protocol, we can directly rely on this support for XA or OTS. When some of the invoked applications do not support such a protocol or when it is unacceptable, from a performance viewpoint, to hold an application's resources (e.g., locks) in the uncertain (i.e., prepared) state for a possibly very long time, one may commit each invoked application separately and as early as possible while resorting to compensation for providing a \semantic notion of atomicity". For example, if a hotel booking is already committed, it can still later be \semantically undone" by issueing an additional \CancelHotel" compensating activity. An implicit assumption here is that exposing the hotel reservation to concurrent work ows in the meantime does not do any harm. If this assumption is not justi ed, additional \seman-tic isolation" steps are needed at the work ow level; these could be based on predicate-oriented locking or con ict testing 67] or on semantic locking for abstract-data-type operations 71, 80] . As for the techniques to implement the undoing of an atomicity sphere, the two cases above are really not that di erent. Once we have registered, in the work ow system, for each a ected activity a compensating activity, the latter can be treated just like \logical" undo operations in a database system. The undo procedure may involve some form of idempotence testing (e.g., based on log sequence numbers) so as to ensure that each activity in an atomicity sphere is undone exactly once. Overall, we can directly build on techniques for handling partial rollbacks to intra-transaction savepoints or, equivalently, undoing of subtransactions in a \closed" type of nested transaction (see, e.g., 68]).
A major problem that we have so far swept under the rug is whether arbitrary sets of activities can be meaningfully combined into an atomicity sphere. The reason why this is an issue is that atomicity spheres must be properly tied to the work ow itself. When the activities of an atomicity sphere are undone, the entire work ow needs to be resumed, for example, by pursueing alternative activities. To make this feasible, the atomicity sphere must also contain updates to control-ow variables and states of the work ow itself. In general, it must contain all state transitions between the states that correspond to the activities in the atomicity sphere. For example, when a sphere with the \CheckHotel" and \CheckFlight" activities is undone, the activities' updates to the work ow's \Cost" variable should be undone, too, and the (sub-) work ow should be reset to the two initial states of the surrounding \CheckTravelCost" (super-) state. To achieve this, we should combine the a ected applications with the work ow servers' state-transition recording into an atomic unit, as discussed in the previous subsections. If, on the other hand, we were to combine the \CheckHotel" and the \SelectConference" states into one atomicity sphere, it is not clear in which state and context (i.e., values of work ow variables) the work ow should be resumed after an undo of this sphere.
For statechart speci cations, a safe solution to this problem is to limit atomicity spheres to single states of the work ow. As states can be nested, this is a fairly general approach already. For other speci cation languages, especially those that are based on arbitrarily structured graphs (some of which have only vaguely de ned operational semantics), the problem may be harder. An intuitive restriction could be to allow only (connected) subgraphs with a single root and a single sink as atomicity spheres. Considerations along these lines can be found in 12, 18, 48] , partly driven by commercial work ow systems.
3.3.5 Towards Failure-resilient Applications. So far we have assumed that all invoked applications of a work ow support some form of atomic commit protocol. In real life, however, many useful applications are not geared for this; think of spreadsheet and other interactive statistical tools, or simulation and virtual-reality animation tools as examples. Even if these tools used a transactional database server for their data management and even if the application did not make any updates to this persistent data, \undoing" (and later re-invoking) the invoked application as a consequence of the work ow's atomic state transitions would result in interactive user work being lost. The user would at least be severely inconvenienced by having to repeat the interactive steps.
In the best possible world, interactive applications should themselves be failure-resilient in the sense that all failures can be masked to the user by appropriate application recovery methods 28, 50] . Then, of course, the surrounding work ow's atomic state transitions should never ask the application for an undo. Rather, when it is guaranteed that the application will be re-invoked by the work ow servers' forward recovery, applications should always be resumed from their most recent state. The techniques for making arbitrary application processes failure-resilient have been around for almost twenty years: essentially, they require periodically saving the application state onto failure-resilient store and logging all messages that are received and sent by the application process 32, 36] . It is the message logging that adds major complexity to this approach, especially if one is also concerned about e ciency. The messages to be considered include:
the invocation of the application and its return message to the work ow server, but also all request and reply messages that the application exchanges with underlying database servers or other business-object servers, and, of course, also all input from and output to the user in the case of an interactive application.
To illustrate the quite complex situations that one has to cope with, consider the scenario of Figure 2 , showing messages as arcs and execution threads as curly lines with time proceeding from left to right. If the invoked application failed right before completing and sending its reply to the work ow server, the application recovery would restart the application process from its last saved state, say from its invocation point in our scenario, then replaying all message events from a log le. However, in this replaying of messages, we need to be careful to avoid resending a message that may lead to non-idempotent e ects. For example, we cannot simply resubmit the application's request to the database server as the processing of this new request would possibly fail to reproduce the server's reply to the original request. (Note that this earlier reply may have been dependent on the interleaved execution of concurrent requests from other clients.) So, rather than resubmitting requests, the restarted application process may have to contact other servers for some previously sent reply messages unless we want to force all message log records to disk immediately. The challenge lies in developing an e cient solution, which aims to minimize the amount of forced logging activity while ensuring server independence and correct recovery under all possible circumstances. A protocol with these properties has been developed in 51], but this method considers only two-tier architectures with client applications and database servers. A generalization to arbitrarily structured systems of work ow, business-object application, and data servers with concurrent executions at all levels is still an open issue. in the previous subsection serve to provide high reliability in that the overall system guarantees correct execution in the presence of failures. If we had information about probabilities of certain failure classes (e.g., transient network or database server failures, permanent disk failures, etc.), we could ideally quantify the probability that the overall system loses its ability to work correctly, for example, when logged information becomes corrupted by a disk failure. If this probability is not su ciently high, we could replicate critical data, especially log les, to increase the overall system reliability. High reliablity does, however, still not guarantee good progress on executing work ows or other classes of client requests. For example, the system could be mostly busy with performing recovery steps during which the processing of active work ows is suspended and new client requests are rejected. Therefore, for high availability we need an additional form of \active redundancy" by replicating also the server processes along with the replication of their underlying (permanent as well as temporary) data. Then, during the recovery of one server, ongoing and newly arriving work could be dynamically switched over to a backup server, so that the system would be continuously available with very high probability (the remaining risk being that primary and backup servers fail simultaneously).
Techniques for operating such highly available multi-server con gurations have been in use for many years in speci c TP environments with a small number of carefully administered servers 7, 57], but applying and generalizing these techniques to an open, manifold world of data servers, work ow servers, and business-object application servers is still an issue that is all but trivial 44]. In particular, it is unclear to what extent the various replication techniques for data as well as processes scale up with the ever-increasing system size and complexity.
Like with reliability, one should ideally be able to quantify the availability that can be guaranteed with a given system con guration (i.e., degree of replication for the various servers and data stores, type of replication protocols, etc.). Conversely, if we need to guarantee a certain availability level (e.g., 99.99 percent or equivalently an expectation of no more than one hour outage per year), we should be able to derive a system con guration that (provably) satis es our goal. Con guration tools along these lines are, however, sorely lacking. In the ideal case, the knowledge about failure rates, repair rates, resulting availability levels, etc. should be built into the system itself, so that it can dynamically re-con gure itself on demand. For example, when a server fails and is unlikely to recover fast, the system could decide to increase the degree of replication by dynamically spawning a third backup server (and creating the corresponding further resources) in addition to the backup server that takes over the failed server's work. Such intelligent decisions would obviously require (probabilistic) models for predicting the service availability for di erent con gurations and time horizons.
Towards Guaranteed Performance and Auto-Tuning Servers.
A situation that could be interpreted as a particular kind of unavailability is an overloaded server with extremely poor, more or less \catastrophic" performance. Even well-administered systems with a lot of human \care and feed" may face this problem as business growth is hard to predict and popular services may be hit by load peaks. The irony is that it is exactly this unanticipated popularity that can lead to a performance disaster and may cause severe damage to the service's reputation and ultimately its revenue. So again we need more intelligent monitoring and con guration tools that can assess the current workload, predict the resulting performance, and derive the required system con guration as early as possible. Initial approaches along these lines have been presented in 8, 73] for work ow management and 60, 61] for multimedia services, but a lot more work is needed towards viable solutions.
Note that introducing some form of admission control to avoid load peaks, as practiced by video servers, is not a truly satisfactory solution as the rejected clients would perceive the service as unavailable (or very slow if the client request is put to wait in an admission queue). Further note that the envisioned kind of con guration tools need to consider not only the expectation values of the userperceived response time and other related metrics (for a given throughput) but also properties of the response time distribution, for example, its 90th or 99th percentile. Ideally, the system should give a stochastic performance guarantee by ensuring that the response time of a client request (e.g., a user interaction within a work ow, or the turnaround time of an entire, fully automated \production work ow") is below a certain user-tolerated threshold with a speci able probability close to one 60, 61] . Such guarantees, ideally on a per user or workload class basis, require advanced stochastic modeling techniques. In addition, one could even combine availability and performance considerations into stochastic predictions of the system's performability (see Section 2.1).
Analogously to the previous subsection's considerations on availability, performance guarantees need to take into account evolving workloads that change over time. To this end, systems should be auto-tuning in that they automatically identify bottlenecks and dynamically re-assign resources to workload classes. In addition, whenever the speci ed performance goals cannot be met with the existing available resources, the system should prompt the service owner to upgrade a server (e.g., adding memory or disks) or extend the overall resource pool by additional servers (e.g., mirror sites in the network). Other than this the system should never require any human intervention, and by giving precise recommendations for the kind of required upgrade (e.g., amount of additional memory needed), such a system should be manageable even by non-trained \operators". This direction towards zero-admin, dynamically auto-tuning and self-healing systems is becoming more pressing as the total cost of an information service is more and more dominated by the costs for the human administrator sta 5, 66, 77, 81].
Strategic Objectives and Research Avenues
Stepping back from the many interesting issues of our work ow example, an observation of strategic importance is that multiple notions of service quality can be combined to obtain \value-added" qualities. In the previous section, it is the synergetic combination of application-speci c safety and liveness arguments with the generic exactly-once-execution guarantee of the surrounding system environment that achieves a substantially higher degree of overall process quality and system dependability. Such synergetic e ects need to be studied much more systematically, however.
Unfortunately, the combination of di erent notions of quality can also lead to tradeo s. In a data warehouse 11, 85] or push-technology information feed 25, 27] , for example, the sheer volume of the data and the manifold information desires dictate a careful system design so as to support the \most insightful" decision-support needs at \a ordable" costs. One may often be willing to trade o some quality of the delivered query results, i.e., comprehensiveness, accuracy, or timeliness (see Section 2.3), for faster response time and/or lower resource consumption. For example, one may prefer a fast approximate result for an aggregation query over nding the exact result after hours, or a few reasonably good matches to some data-mining-style query within seconds over the best matches with a time-consuming and/or expensive service. Being able to cope with such tradeo s in a predictable manner becomes even harder for \mixed" information services that combine information-retrieval-style searching with SQL-style processing and optimization in a highly distributed and heterogeneous environment 10, 26, 42, 58] . Future information service like digital libraries, advanced forms of electronic commerce, or XML-oriented Web-wide information retrieval do require a blend of technologies (information ltering, SQL-based query processing, work ow management, etc.). Understanding and managing the mutual impact of multiple notions of service quality will be absolutely crucial for cost/qualityconscious users of these services, especially when cost means money that will be charged for a service.
The research agenda towards a better understanding of service qualities should follow the well-proven rationale \think globally and x locally". At the \local level", this involves more research on individual notions of quality. For example, despite progress being not nearly as fast as we would (sometimes naively) hope, we should continue and intensify our e orts on applying logic for reasoning about the behavior of information services 13], and applying stochastic modeling for quantifying the availability, performance, and performability of information systems 40]. At the \global level", I would like to encourage bold steps towards truly dependable information systems. Service quality properties should have certain \meta properties" that we should strive for, in order to make quality guaranteeable and manageable. The following list is a modest attempt to identify such meta properties and impose some structure on the envisioned research avenues.
Predictability: An overriding goal is that systems be predictable. This should include both qualitative and quantitative behavior. In other words, it is not su cient to build \scalable" systems whose behavior (e.g., performance) we can only observe empirically in retrospect. Rather predictions of the system's behavior under di erent resource and workload settings should be a fundamental part of the system construction 40]. The importance of predictability cannot be overemphasized; to cite, for example, the strategic US report 78] , \our ability to analyze and predict the performance of the enormously complex software systems that lie at the core of our economy are painfully inadequate". Quanti ability: Whenever we face tradeo s among di erent notions of service quality, we should ideally be able to assess each of these qualities in a quantitative manner. For example, in choosing a Web search engine or information feed, users want to assess the comprehensiveness and accuracy of a service versus its resource consumption or service charges 29]. Along similar lines, combining the ranked result lists from di erent search engines into a global result at the mediator level requires some form of \normalized" merging 31]. So, although we may already start with a quantitative but ordinal property, namely, the ranks from the various search engines, there is a further need to assess the query results on a cardinal scale. This holds especially when we combine our two problem scenarios: mediating result lists from di erent sources under cost constraints. On more traditional ground, the goals of predictability and quanti ability also entail great challenges for query optimization in conventional databases. State-of-the-art optimizers only provide relatively coarse estimations of the resource consumption and runtime for a query's various execution plans. This may have been a reasonable basis for the relative ranking of the alternative plans in order to select a good (albeit not necessarily optimal) plan. However, when we need to cope with tradeo s, say between a plan's resource consumption and the latency of retrieving the rst results in a distributed or parallel system, or when we need to assess the absolute response time and cost versus the \insightfulness" of the query result in a data warehouse or data mining system, we need to come up with predictions that are as precise as possible. This underlines the importance of work on statistically more informed selectivity estimations, and analytic models for resource consumption and resource contention (e.g., memory \pressure"). Certi ability: The quality of an information service should be certi able in a reproducible way with moderate time and resources. This holds for both qualitative properties (e.g., correctness testing), and also quantitative metrics (e.g., benchmarking). Purchasing and deploying systems or subscribing to information services should include a \money-back guarantee" when the promised quality is not achieved in practice. Note that this option does not require a customer to fully understand how the quality guarantee has been derived; testability is su cient. For example, stochastic guarantees about availability or response-time percentiles could be translated into bounds on service downtime or limited numbers of client requests with unacceptable response time over a certain time horizon (e.g., one year). Having the bad luck of \drawing" an unacceptable sample would be considered as a violation of the contract (although the stochastic guarantee could still be valid). Then the underlying stochastic models (or the statistical con dence of measurements) would serve as a risk assessment for the service provider or system vendor. Composability: Future information services will have an \unbundled" (i.e., non-monolithic) but complex architecture consisting of many smaller building blocks like interoperable \business objects" (see, e.g., 5, 30, 46, 86] ). Assuming that each building block provides well de ned service quality guarantees, the challenging next step would be to preserve these guarantees in the composition of building blocks, and transform them into a higher-level notion of \value-added" service quality. In the presence of tradeo s, such higher-level guarantees may be subject to negotiation. Thus, information services also need to support negotiability of their quality guarantees in a mostly automated manner (e.g., based on \agents" that act on behalf of the client's preferences). Explainability: A nal issue is to ensure that users of information services know how to interpret the o ered service qualities. This is particularly delicate with stochastic guarantees, say for performance or availability. Few mortals have a good intuition for and proper assessment of probabilities. However, the limited mathematical background of human customers must not be an excuse for not providing rigorously founded quality guarantees. After all, only few people understand the di erential equations for an in ating airbag in an automobile, but we all do expect our car engineers to have the proper understanding and full control of such critical functions. The sketched problem areas call for intensive research e orts to obtain a better fundamental understanding of service quality. Among the questions to be addressed are: How should service quality properties be speci ed? How can we quantify initially qualitative service properties? How can we cope with tradeo s among quantitative properties? How can we compose the service quality guarantees of multiple building blocks into more comprehensive services that can again give guarantees to their clients? The ultimate goal would be to provide even legally binding guarantees for the ubiquitous information services of future generations.
Concluding Remarks
On the threshold of the 21st century, the IT industry seems to be more and more driven by the fast pace of the \time to market" regime. The database research community ought to be careful so as not to be infected with this virus. We should rather strive for provable correctness, predictable performance, and guaranteed availability -to name some highlights of a comprehensive suite of quality guarantees that are so crucial for truly dependable information services. The steps towards these elusive goals will be laborious and progress will most likely be slow, but it is exactly our role as researchers to tackle the hard problems, especially when they are of such vital nature for the future of our society. In doing this we should increase our awareness of existing work in neighboring elds, and we should recognize the usefulness and necessity of mathematical modeling and reasoning as important tools towards practically viable solutions.
